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NOTES
TORTS - Bad Faith - Tort Victim Has No Cause of
Action Against Tortfeasor's Insurer for Bad Faith
Failure to Settle the Victim's Claim. Kranzush v.
Badger State Mutual Casualty Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 307
N.W.2d 256 (1981).
In Kranzush v. Badger State Mutual Casualty Co.1 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
tort victim has a right to bring an action directly against the
tortfeasor's insurer for bad faith failure to settle the victim's
claim. The court expressly held that a third-party claimant
has no right, either common law or statutory, to assert a bad
faith claim against an insurer. The *basic rationale for this de-
cision was that a liability insurer owes no duty to act in good
faith and to deal fairly to a claimant who is a stranger to the
insurance contract.
Kranzush arose out of an automobile accident in which
Mrs. Gerlikovski, the plaintiff's decedent, was injured when
she was a passenger in the auto being driven by her husband.
Mrs. Gerlikovski subsequently commenced an action in the
circuit court for Brown County against her husband and his
insurer, Badger State Mutual Casualty Co. (Badger).2
Following Mrs. Gerlikovski's death, the administrator of
her estate commenced an action against Badger alleging that
the insurer acted intentionally, arbitrarily and in bad faith in
an attempt to prolong the litigation.3 The complaint further
alleged that the defendant knew of her weakened condition
and that she was going to die within a short period." The gra-
1. 103 Wis. 2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981).
2. The action, involving allegations of negligence and damages arising out of the
accident, was still pending at the time of the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision. 'The
court concluded that the outcome of the underlying action was unimportant since the
issue in Kranzush did not involve an excess judgment.
3. Plaintiff maintained that the acts of constant delay and harassment were in-
tended to cause Mrs. Gerlikovski to give up her claim and to minimize the amount of
Badger's liability for her injuries. It was further alleged that this conduct was en-
gaged in for the purpose of saving Badger money.
4. 103 Wis. 2d at 58, 307 N.W.2d at 258. Mrs. Gerlikovski was suffering from can-
cer and recently had a mastectomy.
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vamen of the complaint was that the insurer engaged in bad
faith conduct in refusing to settle the plaintiff's decedent's
claim.5
Badger moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. The circuit court for
Brown County granted the motion to dismiss on the ground
that no duty is owed by an insurer to a third-party claimant
in relation to the settlement of a claim. Plaintiff appealed
and, in an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals affirmed
the circuit court decision on the same ground advanced by the
circuit court.' The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the de-
cision of the court of appeals.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH
Recognition of the intentional tort of bad faith is a rela-
tively new concept in the area of tort law. One of the earliest
cases to sanction a cause of action for bad faith conduct on
the part of an insurer was Hilker v. Western Automobile In-
surance Co.7 The theory of recovery alleged was that the in-
surer engaged in bad faith conduct in failing to settle the per-
sonal injury claim of the claimant thereby exposing the
insured to a judgment in excess of the policy limits. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court concluded that a liability insurer would
be held liable for bad faith for refusing to settle and ade-
quately investigate such claims against its insureds.
The Hilker court found that the duty of the insurer was
analogous to that of a fiduciary.' The court stated that the
duty to act in good faith could not be predicated upon any
express language contained in the insurance contract. Instead,
the duty was to be "implied as a correlative duty growing out
of certain rights and privileges which the contract confers
5. A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was also presented in the
complaint. Prior to granting the motion to dismiss, the circuit court judge examined
the complaint to see if there were sufficient allegations to sustain a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Judge Duffy found that it did not, but gave the
plaintiff ten days to reframe the complaint to state such a cause of action. However,
plaintiff did not do so.
6. Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 98 Wis. 2d 748, 297 N.W.2d 515
(Ct. App. 1980).
7. 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), aff'd on rehearing, 204 Wis. 1, 12, 235 N.W.
413 (1931).
8. Id. at 6, 231 N.W. at 259.
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upon the insurer."9 In reaching the conclusion that the rela-
tionship between insured and insurer gives rise to a duty to
act in good faith and to deal fairly, the court was persuaded
by principles of agency law since the insurer had absolute con-
trol over the handling of the claim. 10
Although Wisconsin was one of the first states to impose
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the tort of
bad faith did not gain full recognition until the courts of Cali-
fornia began to use it extensively.1 It is a well-settled princi-
ple in California tort law that there is an implied covenant,
implicit in every insurance contract, which imposes upon an
insurer a duty to conduct itself in good faith and to deal
fairly.12 The duty arises by reason of the contractual relation-
ship between the insured and the insurer, but the cause of
action sounds in tort. Prior to 1979, California courts viewed
the duty of good faith and fair dealing as an obligation owed
to the insured by reason of the contractual relationship and
its attendant duties of a fiduciary nature."3 Thus, the benefit
to be derived from the imposition of this duty is one running
to the insured.
California continued to view the duty of good faith as run-
ning only to the insured until the 1979 California Supreme
Court case of Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court. 4
9. Id. at 13, 235 N.W. at 414.
10. The court described the procedure involved to be as follows:
As a condition of affording [the insured] that protection [of indemnification],
the company assumed absolute control of the adjustment of all claims and of
all litigation arising out of such claims. Under such a contract there is no es-
cape from the conclusion that the insurance company became the agent of the
insured for the purpose of handling such claims and of conducting such
litigation.
Id. at 5, 231 N.W. at 259.
. 11. For an excellent discussion of the development of the tort of insurer bad faith
in California, see Kircher, Insurer's Mistaken Judgment - A New Tort?, 59 MARQ.
L. REv. 775 (1976).
12. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973).
13. Id.
14. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979). Royal Globe reversed
the position that the California Supreme Court had taken three years earlier in Mur-
phy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976). The
court did not overrule Murphy, but rather found a distinguishing feature. In Murphy,
the claimant alleged that the insurer violated its duty to its insured in failing to settle
the tort victim's claim, whereas in Royal Globe, the claimant relied upon the insurer's
1982]
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Royal Globe will be discussed in depth in the next section.
However, what the court ultimately held was that a claimant
had a right to hold an insurer directly liable for a bad faith
refusal to settle a reasonably clear claim. The California Su-
preme Court, in the 4-3 decision, relied upon the Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Act 15 and found that the regula-
tory scheme afforded a private civil litigant, either an insured
or a claimant, a vested right to bring a cause of action for
violation of the Act. e
The evolution of the tort of bad faith in Wisconsin, as pre-
viously noted, had its origin in Hilker. Since 1931, Wisconsin
has recognized three separate and distinct areas of recovery
for insurer bad faith.1 7
In Hilker the court stated that when an injured tort victim
makes a claim against the tortfeasor's liability insurer, the in-
surer owes a duty to its insured to exercise good faith conduct
in the investigation and settlement of the claim against its in-
sured. In this area of bad faith recovery, three duties have
evolved which are owed by an insurer: the duty to make an
adequate investigation,18 the duty to inform the insured of the
chance of recovery in excess of policy limits" and the duty to
keep the insured timely and adequately informed of all settle-
duty owed to the claimant which is created by the statutory provisions of the Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Act. 23 Cal. 3d at 889-90, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr.
at 848. See generally Comment, Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court Right
to Direct Suit Against an Insurer by a Third Party Claimant, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1161
(1980).
15. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1980).
16. 23 Cal. 3d at 888, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
17. Although the Kranzush court classified the Wisconsin bad faith cases as in-
volving three separate and distinct areas of insurer bad faith recovery, the cases have,
in reality, fallen into two categories: first-party or third-party bad faith. First-party
insurance generally describes those types of insurance coverage under which the in-
sured recovers benefits directly from his own insurer without the need to establish
fault (e.g., life, accident, homeowner's). Third-party insurance generally describes
those types of insurance coverage where a third party (tort victim) seeks to recover
benefits from the tortfeasor's insurer (i.e., liability). The other cases simply involved
variations on first-party bad faith recovery, such as Coleman v. American Universal
Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615, 273 N.W.2d 220 (1979), which involved an insured bringing a
bad faith action against his worker's compensation carrier. See generally J. GHIARDI
& J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES - LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 8.01-.11 (1981).
18. 204 Wis. at 15, 235 N.W. at 415.
19. Id.
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ment offers. 20 The Wisconsin Supreme Court summarized this
aspect of the tort of bad faith in Alt v. American Family Mu-
tual Insurance Co.21 wherein it stated that bad faith stems
from the breach of a known fiduciary duty which arises from
the exclusive control of the claim being vested in the insurer.2 2
A second area in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
recognized recovery for insurer bad faith was announced in
Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co. 23 This case involved a
claim by an insured against his insurer for an unreasonable
failure to settle the insured's first-party claim. The court al-
lowed the claim based upon the fiduciary duty between the
insurer and the insured which was first mentioned in Hilker.
The court, in embracing this new cause of action, adopted the
language of the California Supreme Court in Gruenberg v.
Aetna Insurance Co.24 in finding that a breach of the implied
duty to deal fairly and in good faith is a separate intentional
wrong which is imposed as a result of the contractual relation-
ship.25 Therefore, Anderson is also important for the proposi-
tion that insurer bad faith is not the same as a tortious breach
20. Baker v. Northwestern Nat'l Casulty Co., 22 Wis. 2d 77, 83, 125 N.W.2d 370,
373 (1963).
21. 71 Wis. 2d 340, 237 N.W.2d 706 (1976).
22. The Alt court stated:
[W]hat we speak of when referring to bad faith is the breach of a known fiduci-
ary duty. This carries with it the duty to act on behalf of the insured and to
exercise the same standard of care that the insurance company would exercise
were it exercising ordinary diligence in respect to its own business .... [A]n
insurance company, in which is vested the exclusive control of the management
of a case, breaches its duty when it has the opportunity to settle an excess
liability case within policy limits and it fails to do so.
Id. at 348, 237 N.W.2d at 712. See also Johnson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 93
Wis. 2d 633, 287 N.W.2d 729 (1980); Howard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co.,
70 Wis. 2d 985, 236 N.W.2d 643 (1975); Howard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 60
Wis. 2d 224, 208 N.W.2d 442 (1973); Nichols v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 37
Wis. 2d 238, 155 N.W.2d 104 (1967); Baker v. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co., 26
Wis. 2d 306, 132 N.W.2d 493 (1965); Maroney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 12 Wis. 2d 197, 107
N.W.2d 261 (1961); Berk v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 245 Wis. 597, 15 N.W.2d 834
(1944).
23. 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
24. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973). The primary reason
the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the rationale of Gruenberg to be persuasive is
that the California Supreme Court based its decision in that case on the language set
forth in Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), aff'd on
rehearing, 204 Wis. 1, 12, 235 N.W. 413 (1931).
25. 85 Wis. 2d at 689, 271 N.W.2d at 375. See supra notes 11-13 and accompany-
ing text.
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of contract.28 The court expressly found that the basis for im-
posing insurer responsibility for fair dealing toward the in-
sured was equally as compelling when the insurer was dealing
with a claim by its insured as when it was dealing with a claim
by a third-party against its insured .2 7 The test for determining
whether there was bad faith conduct on the part of an insurer
is an objective one employing a reasonable person standard:
would a reasonable insurer under the circumstances have de-
nied or delayed payment of the claim. 28 Although this test ap-
pears to employ a negligence standard, the court characterized
the tort of bad faith as an intentional tort. As an intentional
tort, not only are compensatory damages recoverable, but pu-
nitive damages may also be awarded under the proper
circumstances. 9
The third set of circumstances in which the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court has recognized a cause of action for bad faith is
in the area of worker's compensation. 0 In Coleman v. Ameri-
can Universal Insurance Co.3 1 the court recognized that an
injured worker is not barred by the exclusivity provision of
26. The court had previously described the cause of action as "tortious breach of
contract" in Drake v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Wis. 2d 977, 983, 236 N.W.2d 204,
208 (1975).
27. 85 Wis. 2d at 689, 271 N.W.2d at 375.
28. Id. at 692, 271 N.W.2d at 377. The court further stated that although there
must be
knowledge or reckless disregard of a reasonable basis for a denial, implicit in
that test is [the] conclusion that the knowledge of the lack of a reasonable
basis may be inferred and imputed to an insurance company where there is a
reckless disregard of a lack of a reasonable basis for denial or a reckless indif-
ference to facts or to proofs submitted by the insured.
Id. at 693, 271 N.W.2d at 377. Thus, an insurer will only be held liable where there is
a showing of an intentional denial or delay of a claim without a reasonable basis. If
the claim is found to be fairly debatable, then an insurer has the right to challenge
the claim.
29. The Anderson court held that the proof of bad faith conduct by an insurer
does not necessarily signify that there will also be an award of punitive damages. The
underlying purposes sought to be achieved by the imposition of punitive damages are
punishment of the wrongdoer and to serve as a deterrent. Mid-Continent Refrigerator
Co. v. Straka, 47 Wis. 2d 739, 746, 178 N.W.2d 28, 32 (1970). As the court stated in
Anderson, "[flor punitive damages to be awarded, a defendant must not only inten-
tionally have breached his duty of good faith, but in addition must have been guilty
of oppression, fraud, or malice in the special sense defined by Mid-Continent v.
Straka." 85 Wis. 2d at 697, 271 N.W.2d at 379. See also Davis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 101
Wis. 2d 1, 303 N.W.2d 596 (1981).
30. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
31. 86 Wis. 2d 615, 273 N.W.2d 220 (1979).
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the Worker's Compensation Act 32 and, therefore, may bring a
claim against the insurer for bad faith in the handling of a
claim for benefits under a worker's compensation policy. The
court stated that the primary rationale underlying the
worker's compensation provisions was that the injured worker
gives up his common-law right to sue his employer in ex-
change for coverage of all work-related injuries no matter who
is at fault.3 The court further reasoned that the goal of the
statutory provisions would be defeated if insurers were per-
mitted to conduct themselves in bad faith. By allowing a
worker to bring a cause of action for bad faith, the worker has
some security in knowing "that his exclusive remedy will not
be denied through the intentional wrongdoings of the
insurer."'
'
II. THE Kranzush DECISION
At issue in Kranzush was whether a person injured by the
alleged negligence of an insured can bring an action against
the tortfeasor's insurer for failing to settle the victim's claim
in good faith. 5 Kranzush addressed five separate questions in
order to resolve the main issue of whether to permit this right
of action. First, can the principle set forth in Hilker and Alt,
involving excess judgment-bad faith actions, be extended to
support a claim by a third-party claimant? 6 Second, can the
Anderson ruling be extended to support this type of claim?3 7
Third, can the holding in Coleman be read to offer a basis for
this type of third-party claim?3 8 Fourth, if the aforementioned
cases do not support this theory of recovery, should the Wis-
consin Supreme Court nonetheless recognize this new right of
action?" 8 Fifth, does the direct action statute,'0 section
601.01(2),' 1 which sets forth one of the purposes of the insur-
32. Wis. STAT. § 102.03(2) (1981).
33. 86 Wis. 2d at 621, 273 N.W.2d at 222.
34. 103 Wis. 2d at 65, 307 N.W.2d at 261.
35. Id. at 57, 307 N.W.2d at 257.
36. Id. at 63-64, 307 N.W.2d at 260-61.
37. Id. at 64-65, 307 N.W.2d at 261.
38. Id. at 65-67, 307 N.W.2d at 261-62.
39. Id. at 67-74, 307 N.W.2d at 262-65.
40. Wis. STAT. § 632.24 (1981).
41. Wis. STAT. § 601.01(2) (1981), provides: "The purposes of chs. 600 to 646 are:
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ance code, or does Wisconsin's version of the Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act42 create a duty to act fairly and in
(2). To ensure that policyholders, claimants and insurers are treated fairly and
equitably .... "
42. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § INS 6.11 provides:
Ins. 6.11 Insurance claim settlement practices. (1) PURPOSE. This rule
is to promote the fair and equitable treatment of policyholders, claimants and
insurers by defining certain claim adjustment practices which are considered to
be unfair methods and practices in the business of insurance. The rule imple-
ments and interprets applicable statutes including but not limited to §§ 601.04,
601.01(3)(b), and 645.41(3), Stats.
(3) UNFAIR CLAIM SETTLEMENT PRACTICES. (a) Any of the following
acts, if committed by any person without just cause and performed with such
frequency as to indicate general business practice, shall constitute unfair meth-
ods and practices in the business of insurance:
1. Failure to promptly acknowledge pertinent communications with respect
to claims arising under insurance policies.
2. Failure to initiate and conclude a claims investigation with all reasonable
dispatch.
3. Failure to promptly provide necessary claims forms, instructions and
reasonable assistance to insureds and claimants under its insurance policies.
4. Failure to attempt in good faith to effectuate fair and equitable settle-
ment of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear.
5. Failure upon request of a claimant, to promptly provide a reasonable
explanation of the basis in the policy contract or applicable law for denial of a
claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.
6. Knowingly misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or policy provi-
sions relating to coverages involved.
7. Failure to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time
after proof of loss has been completed.
8. Failure to settle a claim under one portion of the policy coverage in order
to influence a settlement under another portion of the policy coverage.
9. Except as may be otherwise provided in the policy contract, the failure to
offer settlement under applicable first party coverage on the basis that respon-
sibility for payment should be assumed by other persons or insurers.
10. Compelling insureds and claimants to institute suits to recover amounts
due under its policies by offering substantially less than the amounts ulti-
mately recovered in suits brought by them.
11. Refusing payment of claims solely on the basis of the insured's request
to do so without making an independent evaluation of the insured's liability
based upon all available information.
12. Failure, where appropriate, to make use of arbitration procedures au-
thorized or permitted under any insurance policy.
13. Adopting or making known to insureds or claimants a policy of appeal-
ing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of
compelling them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount
awarded in arbitration.
(b) Any of the following acts committed by any person shall constitute un-
fair methods and practices in the business of insurance:
1. Knowingly misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or policy provi-
sions relating to coverages involved.
[Vol. 65:463
TORTS
good faith toward third-party claimants?43 The court ruled
against the third-party claimant on all five questions.
Considered in the context of Wisconsin Supreme Court de-
cisions in the area, Kranzush was a well-reasoned decision
which halted the trend of allowing recovery for insurer bad
faith in a variety of circumstances. Already, with the Coleman
decision, the intentional tort of had faith had been extended
to encompass an area of the law that had previously been
thought of as impenetrable because of the exclusive remedy
provision of the Worker's Compensation Act. The Kranzush
decision laid to rest any confusion stemming from dicta con-
tained in Coleman to the effect that the rationale underlying
the decision in Anderson was not only applicable to a first-
party claim but was also applicable to third-party claims."
A. Excess Liability Cases
Justice Callow, writing for the majority, authored a deci-
sion that discussed almost every theory which could be found
to be a valid basis for recognizing the cause of action at is-
sue. 45 The majority opinion began with an inquiry of whether
2. Failure to make provision for adequate claims handling personnel, sys-
tems and procedures to effectively service claims in this state incurred under
insurance coverage issued or delivered in this state.
3. Failure to adopt reasonable standards for investigation of claims arising
under its insurance policies.
4. PROMPT DEFINED. Except where a different period is specified by
statute or rule and except for good cause shown, the terms "prompt" and
"promptly" as used in this rule shall mean responsive action within 10 consec-
utive days from receipt of a communication concerning a claim.
5. PENALTY. The commission of any of the acts listed in subsections
(3)(a) or (3)(b)2., or 3. shall subject the person to revocation of license to trans-
act insurance in this state. Violations of this rule or any order issued thereun-
der shall subject the person violating the same to s. 601.64, Stats.
43. 103 Wis. 2d at 77-82, 307 N.W.2d at 267-69.
44. 86 Wis. 2d at 620, 273 N.W.2d at 221-22. The court simply limited Coleman
and its attendant dicta to the worker's compensation situation involving insurer bad
faith conduct.
45. The one theory which Justice Callow did not discuss is the third-party benefi-
ciary theory expounded in Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 259
(Fla. 1971). In this case, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the rule that injured
third parties are intended beneficiaries of the insurance contract since the policy and
the Financial Responsibility Law are primarily for the benefit and protection of third
parties. Id. at 263. Contra Page v. Allstate Ins. Co., 126 Ariz. 258, 614 P.2d 339 (Ct.
App. 1980); Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr.
19821
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Alt could be extended to permit a cause of action by a third-
party claimant. In reaching the decision that it could not, Jus-
tice Callow emphasized the fact that in Kranzush the court
was not dealing with an excess judgment since the underlying
negligence action had not as yet been decided.4" The court
further noted that the interest sought to be protected in Alt
was not the claimant's recovery, but rather, the insured's po-
tential excess liability.47
Kranzush adheres to fifty years of case law in the area of
excess liability-bad faith tort law. The relevant Wisconsin Su-
preme Court cases in this sphere of tort law demonstrate that
the insurer's duty to deal fairly and in good faith in the inves-
tigation, communication of settlement offers and notice of the
possibility of an excess judgment can run only to the in-
sured.48 Furthermore, the third-party claimant is a stranger to
the contractual relationship between the insured and the in-
surer and any dealings with the third-party claimant are con-
ducted in an adversarial manner.
An important basis for reaching the conclusion that the
excess liability-bad faith cases provide an inadequate founda-
tion for the inclusion of the type of cause of action at issue in
Kranzush is the rationale set forth in Hilker. The primary
424 (1976); Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 IM. App. 3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718 (App.
Ct. 1979); Bennett v. Slater, 154 Ind. App. 67, 289 N.E.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1972); Bean
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 285 Md. 572, 403 A.2d 793 (1979); Lisiewski v. Countrywide Ins.
Co., 75 Mich. App. 631, 255 N.W.2d 714 (Ct. App. 1977); Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 677
(1975 and Supp. 1980); Comment, Liability Insurers and Third-Party Claimants:
The Limits of Duty, 48 U. CHL L. REv. 125, 140-44 (1981).
46. Of the cases which have allowed a private cause of action by a third-party
claimant, the 1981 West Virginia case of Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 280
S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981), ruled that before the statutory claim for violation of the
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act may be brought, it is necessary that the un-
derlying claim be resolved. The court's reasoning was that the claimant may not
choose to pursue the statutory claim as he may be content with the result of the
underlying claim. Id. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 259.
In accord is Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329,
153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979). However, the California Supreme Court stated that the
reasons the statutory claim should be delayed were that evidence of insurance is inad-
missible, damages are more easily determined after the initial action, and the defense
of the insured may be hampered by discovery by the injured claimant against the
insurer. Id. at 891-92, 592 P.2d at 336-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849-50.
47. 103 Wis. 2d at 63, 307 N.W.2d at 261.
48. Id. at 63-64, 307 N.W.2d at 260-61. Furthermore, the cases dealing with bad
faith excess judgments have involved a plaintiff who is either the insured or an as-
signee of the insured.
[Vol. 65:463
TORTS
reason the court permitted the cause of action in Hilker was
that the insured gives up total control over the settlement of
any claims arising from the insurance policy in exchange for
indemnification. The court, in declaring that Alt was an inap-
propriate case to form a basis for recognizing the cause of ac-
tion asserted by the petitioner in Kranzush, engaged in an in-
depth analysis of the numerous articulated rationales underly-
ing the development of bad faith as it relates to excess judg-
ment cases. The Kranzush court concluded that the focus of
insurer liability in this situation should be on a breach of duty
owed to the insured and not to the injured claimant.49
B. First-Party Cases
Justice Callow next examined Anderson to see if the hold-
ing in that case would offer a foundation for recognizing a
right of action by a claimant against the tortfeasor's insurer
for failure to settle an underlying claim in good faith. The An-
derson Court relied on the relationship between the insured
and the insurer which is created by the insurance contract in
concluding that there is a fiduciary relationship.50 Again, the
third-party claimant's lack of a contractual relationship and
the fact that a claimant is a stranger to the insurance policy
were cited as controlling factors by the court. Justice Heifer-
nan, in a concurring opinion, strongly disagreed with the ma-
jority's conclusion that the right of action asserted in
Kranzush was dependent upon the prior relationship of the
parties.5 Justice Heffernan maintained that the reasoning of
the majority was contrary to basic tort law since intentional
torts arise as a result of the actions of the tortfeasor and the
ensuing relationship. Therefore, intentional torts do not de-
pend upon prior relations between the parties.52
49. See Comment, Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court: Right to Direct
Suit Against an Insurer by a Third-Party Claimant, 31 HAsTINGs L.J. 1161 (1980).
50. 103 Wis. 2d at 64, 307 N.W.2d at 261. "The heart of the tort recognized in
Anderson is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the
insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract."
Id.
51. 103 Wis. 2d at 84, 307 N.W.2d at 270 (Heffernan, J., concurring). "The major-
ity opinion, following the argument of the insurance company defendant, takes the
position that the possibility of a commission of a tort is dependent on the prior rela-
tionship of the parties. This, I conclude, is contrary to basic tort law." Id.
52. Id. at 84, 307 N.W.2d at 270 (Heffernan, J., concurring).
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The Kranzush court distinguished the right of a third-
party to bring an action for failure to settle a claim in bad
faith and the right of an insured to maintain such an action.
In the latter situation, the right of the insured to be dealt
with fairly is established at the time the parties enter into the
contract of insurance and, therefore, finds its roots in the in-
surance policy. On the other hand, in the situation involving a
third-party claimant, there is no comparable relationship of
trust and confidence implicit in the contract.5 1 In discussing
this area of the tort of bad faith, the court sent a sufficiently
simple and unqualified signal to the courts, the insurance in-
dustry and members of the plaintiffs' bar: no cause of action
involving the right of a claimant to be treated in a fair manner
in the settlement of the claim is actionable unless the claim-
ant is in a contractual relationship with the insurer which in-
volves trust and confidence.5 4
It therefore appears that the necessary prerequisite to
maintaining a bad faith cause of action is a vested right which
emanates from the contract of insurance. 5 There is a vested
right because the insured has a reasonable expectation, when
entering into the contractual relationship, that any claim aris-
ing out of such contract will be paid without delay once the
insurer determines, in a reasonable amount of time, that the
claim is legitimate.5 6 On the other hand, a third-party claim-
ant has no reasonable basis for believing that an insurer owes
him or her a duty to deal fairly and in good faith.
One commentator has suggested that allowing the duty of
good faith to cover the injured party is a natural extension of
the first-party bad faith claim.57 While the protection of per-
53. "The third-party claimant has not contracted for insurance benefits and is not
in a contractual relationship, much less a relationship of trust, with the insurer." Id.
at 64, 307 N.W.2d at 261.
54. Id. at 64, 307 N.W.2d at 261.
55. Id. at 85, 307 N.W.2d at 270 (Heffernan, J., concurring). Justice Heffernan
quoted Prosser in his conclusion that whatever a tort may be, one thing it is not is a
breach of contract. "Thus a contractual relationship as a general proposition is totally
alien to the tort concept. . . . [Therefore], such a relationship is not always a neces-
sary prerequisite." Id. at 85, 307 N.W.2d at 271.
56. Id. at 64-65, 307 N.W.2d at 261.
57. Comment, Extending the Insurer's Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to
Third Parties Under Liability Insurance Policies, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1413 (1978). It
was suggested that the third-party needs just as much protection as the insured and
therefore the public policy reason supporting extension of the duty is simply the pre-
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sons from all damages sustained by the conduct of others is an
admirable position, liability should not be imposed for tor-
tious conduct of any kind unless the law has recognized some
specific duty which has been breached. In this context, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly held that no common-law
or contractual duty to act fairly and in good faith ran to a
third-party claimant and thus concluded that no cause of ac-
tion for tortious conduct could be maintained in this
situation.
C. The Coleman Rationale
Kranzush also entered into a discussion of whether the de-
cision in Coleman could be read to offer a basis for a third-
party claim against an insurer for failure to settle the claim in
good faith. In reaching the conclusion that Coleman does not
provide such a basis, the court engaged in a comparison of the
alternatives available to the injured worker as opposed to the
claimant if there is a failure to settle a claim in bad faith.
Justice Callow placed emphasis on the fact that since the in-
jured worker was faced with the problem of the exclusive rem-
edy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act, his alterna-
tives were far more restricted than those of an injured
claimant.58 Another factor set forth to distinguish the injured
worker from the injured claimant is that the injured third-
party claimant must still prove the fault of the tortfeasor
whereas the injured worker need not prove fault in order to
get recovery for a work-related injury.
The Kranzush court was faced with the dilemma of how to
interpret broad language embodied in the Coleman decision.59
The language could easily have been read to grant the type of
vention of additional damages to the claimant who has already suffered damages from
the initial conduct of the insured. Id. at 1417-18.
58. The third-party claimant still has the ability to recover primary damages in-
curred as a result of the initial tort, whereas the injured worker who is denied bene-
fits in bad faith has very little else he can do.
59. In Coleman the Wisconsin Supreme Court appeared to sanction just such a'
claim as was at issue in Kranzush when it read the rationale underlying the Anderson
decision in the following manner: "It is apparent that the rationale of Anderson is
applicable not only to the claim of a first-party insured against its insurance com-
pany, but is also applicable when the case involves a third-party claim against an
insurer." 86 Wis. 2d at 620, 273 N.W.2d at 221-22.
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cause of action the petitioner in Kranzush was asserting."0
Notwithstanding this apparently obvious language extending
the Anderson rationale to encompass all third parties, the
Kranzush court determined that the broad language was
merely dicta. In making this determination, the court limited
the language to the situation involving worker's compensa-
tion.6' The court set forth numerous reasons why the Coleman
language should not be read as conferring a right of action
upon a claimant against the tortfeasor's insurer.6 2 Among
those reasons, the most compelling was the lack of a compre-
hensive statutory scheme6 s which pointedly disclosed that if a
duty were found to exist, it must be a common law duty. Fur-
thermore, the court emphasized the need for a fiduciary rela-
tionship when it compared the relationship of the injured em-
ployee and the insurer to that of the insured and the insurer
in a first-party situation.6 4 Therefore, it appears that in all
60. Thus, the court could have stated that it was merely following precedent and
was simply holding steadfast to the rationale underlying the tort of bad faith which
was announced in Anderson.
61. Prior to the Kranzush decision, holding that the aforementioned language was
unnecessarily broad, a federal district court and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals de-
termined that Coleman should be limited to its facts. In Bruheim v. Little, 98 Wis. 2d
178, 295 N.W.2d 793 (Ct. App. 1980), aff'd, 103 Wis. 2d 96, 307 N.W.2d 276 (1981),
the court held that the trial court correctly limited Coleman to its facts. The court
stated that "[tihe court's decision in... [Coleman] specifically pointed out that the
basis for the tort of bad faith being recognized there arose out of the contractual
obligation of the insurer to pay worker's compensation benefits to the claimant." Id.
at 180-81, 295 N.W.2d at 794. Therefore, Coleman was interpreted as creating a cause
of action for bad faith which arises from the employment contractual relationship.
The court further found that granting this right to all third-party claimants "would
negate the fundamental contractual basis for this right, including the consideration
paid for it by the insureds." Id. at 181, 295 N.W. 2d at 795. Accord Ginger v. Coronet
Ins. Co., 508 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Uebelacker v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 500
F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
62. 103 Wis. 2d at 65-67, 307 N.W.2d at 261-62.
63. The court looked at Wis. STAT. §§ 632.34(2), (3), (6), 632.35, 632.24, and
632.22 (1977) which the petitioner asserted granted the third-party claimant a special
relationship with the tortfeasor's insurer. In examining these statutes, the Kranzush
court concluded that it did not combine to create the type of no-fault comprehensive
statutory scheme embodied in the worker's compensation statutes. Therefore, the
special conditions which are present in the injured worker-insurer relationship which
give rise to a recognizable cause of action were found not to be present in the third-
party claimant-insurer relationship. 103 Wis. 2d at 66-67, 307 N.W.2d at 262.
64. "[O]wing to the design of the worker's compensation laws, the injured em-
ployee and the insurance carrier occupy relative positions which are analogous to the
insurer-insured relationship at the heart of the Anderson tort." Id. at 66, 307 N.W.2d
at 261.
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three situations thus far discussed, a necessary prerequisite to
recovery on the theory of bad faith is a contractual relation-
ship with its attendant fiduciary duties.
D. Judicial Recognition
Subsequent to concluding that Coleman failed to offer a ba-
sis for recognizing a claim by a tort victim against the
tortfeasor's insurer, the Wisconsin Supreme Court entered
into a discussion of whether it should nevertheless recognize
this additional right of action. The court initially discussed
the often litigated issue of whether to allow a judgment credi-
tor6 5 to seek the excess judgment from the insurer where no
assignment has been made. The majority of jurisdictions
which have addressed this issue have found that, absent an
assignment from the insured, an excess judgment creditor has
no cause of action directly against the insurer."
The court then reached the heart of the issue of whether
to allow a bad faith action by a claimant against the
tortfeasor's insurer. The discussion began with an acknowl-
edgment of the fact that few courts had addressed the issue
presented in Kranzush.67 The court characterized the peti-
65. A judgment creditor, in the bad faith situation, is a claimant who has received
a judgment in excess of the tortfeasor's policy limits and where the tortfeasor in turn
has a claim for bad faith in failing to settle the claim against his insurer. See gener-
ally J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PuNrrrvE DAMAGES - LAw AND PRAcTIcE § 8.03 (1981).
66. The court could have ignored this issue since it had no direct relationship to
the issue in Kranzush. However, it appears that the court entered into the discussion
in order to set an historical backdrop to a general judicial stance showing the hesi-
tancy of permitting direct third-party actions. The reason most often advanced for
denying this cause of action is that there is a lack of a contractual relationship be-
tween the third-party claimant and the insurer. Furthermore, courts often cite the
proposition that rather than suffering a loss from the failure to settle, the third-party
claimant often benefits from breach of the duty to act fairly and in good faith. See,
e.g., Page v. Allstate Ins. Co., 126 Ariz. 258, 614 P.2d 339 (Ct. App. 1980); Murphy v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976); Scroggins v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 74 IMI. App. 3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718 (App. Ct. 1979); Bennett v.
Slater, 154 Ind. App. 67, 289 N.E.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1972); Bean v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
285 Md. 572, 403 A.2d 793 (1979); Lisiewski v. Countrywide Ins. Co., 75 Mich. App.
631, 255 N.W.2d 714 (Ct. App. 1977). See also cases recognizing this cause of action,
Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1971); Rutter v. King,
57 Mich. App. 152, 226 N.W.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1974).
For a complete discussion of this area of bad faith recovery, see generally Annot.,
63 A.L.R.3d 677 (1975 and Supp. 1980); Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsi-
bility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1136 (1954).
67. 103 Wis. 2d at 68, 307 N.W.2d at 263.
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tioner's cause of action as being for injuries, involving em-
barassment and distress, sustained as a result of unfair tactics
by the insurer in refusing to settle the claim and the depriva-
tion of benefits which the claimant believes is due."8 By char-
acterizing the cause of action as involving the breach of a duty
owed directly to third-party claimants, the court laid to rest
any future reliance by claimants on the excess judgment cases
or on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
which runs to the insured.
The Kranzush court adopted the language of a 1977 Maine
case69 in making a public policy determination that a recogni-
tion of this type of claim would be a "serious and unprece-
dented departure 7 0 from firmly entrenched principles of tort
law. The rationale employed by the Supreme Court of Maine
and adopted by the Kranzush court was to analyze the rela-
tionship between the claimant and the insured. This relation-
ship was found to be an adversarial one wherein the insured
was under no obligation to settle or negotiate with the claim-
ant. The Maine Supreme Court applied principles of agency
law in placing the insurer in the shoes of its insured with the
insurer being the insured's agent. 1 Viewing this relationship
as involving a principal (the insured) and an agent (the in-
surer), the court concluded that the claimant has no greater
rights against the agent than he would have against the
principal.
Other courts have advanced different reasons for not ex-
tending the insurer's implied duty to the third-party claimant.
One court placed reliance upon the excess judgment cases
with the resulting conclusion that if the basic principle that
the duty runs to the insured bars actions by excess judgment
creditors lacking an assignment, then it obviously also bars
claimants who are merely potential judgment creditors.7 2 A
68. Id. at 73, 307 N.W.2d at 265.
69. Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d 1161 (Me. 1977).
70. 103 Wis. 2d at 73, 307 N.W.2d at 265.
71. [T]hat the insurer is the representative of the insured logically imports
that the third party tort claimant's status as the adversary of the insured ren-
ders him, ipso facto, the adversary of the insured's agent. Thus, prior to the
establishment of legal liability, as the tort claimant has no legal right to re-
quire the tortfeasor to negotiate or settle, it likewise lacks right to require such
action by his representative. 368 A.2d at 1163-64 (citation omitted).
72. Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 1027,_, 393 N.E.2d 718, 721
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Washington court simply relied on basic contract law in con-
cluding that the implied covenant to deal fairly and in good
faith runs only to the insured and, therefore, an insurer has
no contractual obligations to a claimant.7 1
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, after reviewing numerous
cases dealing with the issue presented in Kranzush, found a
recurrent theme emphasized in every case: no duty is owed by
the insurer to a third-party claimant to settle or negotiate the
claim in good faith.74 Justice Callow took all of the foregoing
factors into consideration in reaching his conclusion not to
recognize this new right of action.7 5
E. Statutory Basis
After declining to acknowledge the existence of this new
right of action under common law tort principles, Justice Cal-
low turned to an examination of relevant Wisconsin statutes
to determine whether there was a statutory or regulatory right
of action. The court properly set forth the axiom of law which
must be employed as a guideline when the court engages in
statutory interpretation. The general rule is that statutes will
not be construed as changing the common law unless the in-
tention to do so is clearly expressed.7 6 Furthermore, the court
must look at several factors when making a determination of
(App. Ct. 1979). The Illinois Appellate Court further concluded that since in order to
bring a cause of action, "the plaintiff must allege facts showing a breach of a duty
owed to him," taken together with the basic premise that the duty is one owed to the
insured, the third-party claimant is incapable of making the necessary allegations as
there can be no breach of a duty without finding a duty in the first instance. Id. at-,
393 N.E.2d at 721.
73. Bowe v. Eaton, 17 Wash. App. 840, 565 P.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1977). "Regardless
of the choice of language, the insurance company must have breached a duty owed to
the appellant [the tort victim] before it was liable for damages under a tort theory."
Id. at -, 565 P.2d at 829.
74. 103 Wis. 2d at 72, 307 N.W.2d at 265.
75. The court analyzed agency law, contract law and the fundamental principles
espoused in their previous bad faith decisions in reaching the inevitable conclusion
that the duty of good faith arises from the contract of insurance; it cannot be implied
to run to the tort victim and there can be no reasonable expectation on the part of
the tort victim that there would be such a duty in existence. Id. at 73-74, 307 N.W.2d
at 265.
76. Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 233 Wis. 467, 290 N.W.199
(1940). "Statutes are not to be construed as changing the common law unless the
purpose to effect such change is clearly expressed therein .... [Tihe language [of
the statute] must be clear, unambiguous and preemptory." Id. at 474, 290 N.W. at
202 (quoting Meek v. Pierce, 19 Wis. 300, 303 (1865)).
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whether a statute confers a private right of action. These fac-
tors include looking at the form or language of the statute,
determining the kind of evil sought to be cured, and the pur-
pose behind enacting the legislation."
The court initially analyzed the direct action statute78 to
see whether this statute granted a third-party claimant a right
of action for bad faith directly against the insurer. The court
dismissed the direct action statute as not conferring such a
right of action by a claimant in this situation since it was clear
from the language of the statute that the claimant has only
those rights against the insurer that he would have against the
insured. Therefore, since the claimant could not maintain a
bad faith action against the insured, he is unable to maintain
one directly against the insurer using the direct action
statute.79
Justice Callow then examined section 601.01(2) to deter-
mine if a right of action exists under this statute which con-
tains one of eleven enumerated purposes of chapters 600-
646.80 The petitioner contended that this statute should be
read as imposing a statutory duty on an insurer to treat claim-
ants as fairly and equitably as its policyholders. The court dis-
agreed strongly with this contention, determining that the
statute expressed no clear intent to change the common law.
It was clear that the enumerated purposes, when read to-
gether, evinced the primary goal of the legislature in enacting
these statutes: to provide "benefits to the general public wel-
fare which flow from a well-regulated insurance industry." '81
77. McNeill v. Jacobson, 55 Wis. 2d 254, 258-59, 198 N.W.2d 611, 613 (1972). An-
other precept which must be kept in mind when engaging in statutory interpretation
is that "the general rule is that a statute which does not purport to establish a civil
liability, but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as
an entity, is not subject to a construction establishing a civil liability." Id. at 259, 198
N.W.2d at 614 (quoting 50 Am. JuR., Statutes § 586 (1944)).
78. Wis. STAT. § 632.24 (1977) which provides that an insurer is liable up to policy
limits to "the persons entitled to recover against the insured for the death of any
person or for injury to persons or property."
79. In other words, the liability of the insurer to the claimant is contingent upon
the liability of the insured in the first instance. 103 Wis. 2d at 75, 307 N.W.2d at 266.
80. Wis. STAT. § 601.01(2) (1977) provides that one of the purposes of chapters
600 to 646, the insurance regulatory statutes, is "[t]o ensure that policyholders, claim-
ants and insurers are treated fairly and equitably."
81. 103 Wis. 2d at 76, 307 N.W.2d at 267. The court was further influenced by the
fact that the duty of enforcement for violations of specific statutes or rules was placed
with the Commissioner of Insurance under section 601.41(1).
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Applying the aforementioned goal to the general rule that a
cause of action will not be implied from a statute or regulation
which primarily provides for the general welfare, the court
concluded that this was just such a statute; therefore, no right
of action would be implied in favor of the claimant against the
insurer.
Having concluded that neither of the foregoing statutes
conferred a right of action on the claimant, the court next fo-
cused on Wisconsin Administrative Code, section Insurance
6.11.82 This regulation, referred to as the Unfair Claims Set-
tlement Practices Act, describes specific insurer practices
which are denominated as unfair. An insurer who engages in
such practices will be subject to the sanctions available to the
commissioner of insurance under the Code. Justice Callow en-
gaged in a more in-depth analysis of the Unfair Claims Settle-
ment Practices Act since, at the time of the decision, Califor-
nia had already declared it to grant a private right of action in
Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court.8 3 Justice Callow
began his analysis by concluding that there was a basic dis-
tinction between the Act and section 601.01(2) of the Wiscon-
sin Statutes. While section 601.01(2) was construed as di-
rected toward benefitting the general public welfare, the Act
was interpreted as being for the benefit of insureds and claim-
ants." The court found that the Act represented a more im-
minent concern of the legislators regarding the treatment of
claimants and insureds. Although the court determined that
the Act was enacted to benefit a specific group of persons, this
did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a private right
of action had been created.
The court was influenced by the lack of any expression of
legislative intent to create such a vested statutory right. Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that the expressed purpose of
82. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
83. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979). See supra notes 14-16
and accompanying text. Since California had relied upon Hilker in the Gruenberg
case which sanctioned a cause of action for insurer bad faith and Wisconsin, in turn,
relied upon Gruenberg, a California Supreme Court case, in extending the duty to
first-party actions, the Kranzush court would have been improper if it had totally
ignored this new and radical development in California bad faith tort law.
84. 103 Wis. 2d at 79, 307 N.W.2d at 268.
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the rule85 signified that it should be treated as the logical
complement of sections 601.01(3) and 601.64, which define
certain practices as constituting unfair conduct. Moreover, the
Kranzush court interpreted the prefatory language of Ins 6.11
as merely providing an interpretive aid to the commissioner of
insurance in performing her enforcement duties. The court
ended its analysis of this rule by stating that it would be in-
consistent with general rules of statutory interpretation and
the function 8 of Ins 6.11 to imply a private right of action.
The imposition of a vested statutory duty running to
third-party claimants would be an abrogation of the judi-
cially-created rule of insurance law that the duty to deal fairly
and in good faith runs only to the insured.87 Therefore, a
court of law should not imply a private right of action from a
statute or regulation unless the intent to do so is clearly and
unambigously expressed."8 It is clear that the Act does not
clearly express such a legislative intent.""
Although it might be obvious to most that the Act does
not grant such a right of action to third-party claimants, the
California Supreme Court interpreted the Act in a different
light in Royal Globe. The Royal Globe decision was grounded
upon a provision of the Act90 which has no companion in the
85. Ins 6.11(1) expresses the purpose of the rule as "promot[ing] the fair and eq-
uitable treatment of policyholders, claimants and insurers by defining certain claim
adjustment practices which are considered to be unfair methods and practices in the
business of insurance." (emphasis added).
The court found the italicized phrase to be compelling in its determination that
Ins 6.11 should merely be viewed as an extension of §§ 601.01(3) and 601.64 of the
Wisconsin Statutes. 103 Wis. 2d at 80, 307 N.W.2d at 268.
86. The function of Ins 6.11 was simply found to be an "aid to the interpretation
and implementation of the insurance statutes." 103 Wis. 2d at 81, 307 N.W.2d at 269.
87. The duty of good faith and fair dealing was aptly described by a Michigan
court when it stated that "the duty of using good-faith in settlement negotiation is a
duty to protect the insured - it is of a fiduciary nature and is personal to the rela-
tionship between the insured and insurer . . . ." Lisiewski v. Countrywide Ins. Co.,
75 Mich. App. 631, -, 255 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Ct. App. 1977).
88. See generally Comment, The Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act: A Pri-
vate Cause of Action for Third Party Claimants Seeking Punitive Damages, 6 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 73, 85-92 (1981).
89. "While other unfair practices defined in the statute may refer to claimants, we
believe that a more explicit legislative intent to extend the duty to settle to third
party claimants should be required where imposition of such a duty would be in dero-
gation of so much common law." 74 IMl. App. 3d at -, 393 N.E.2d at 724.
90. CAL. INs. CoDE § 790.03 (West Supp. 1981).
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Wisconsin insurance laws.9 1 Concluding that there was no
comparable provision in Wisconsin, the Kranzush court deter-
mined that the Act was merely a description of the "commis-
sioner's arsenal of enforcement tools . ... " The Wisconsin
Supreme Court simply did not find the Royal Globe analysis
to be persuasive. 93
III. JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON CONCURRENCE
Justice Abrahamson, in a concurring opinion, was per-
suaded by the theory of the claimant being a third-party ben-
eficiary of the insurance contract. By viewing the claimant as
an intended beneficiary, Justice Abrahamson concluded that
claimants should be treated in the same manner as an in-
sured; therefore, the duty to deal fairly and in good faith
91. The statute in Royal Globe provided that a "cease and desist order issued by
the commissioner under the provisions of the act shall not absolve an insurer from
'civil liability or criminal penalty under the laws of this State arising out of the
methods, acts or practices found unfair or deceptive."' (emphasis in original). 23
Cal. 3d at 885, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
92. 103 Wis. 2d at 82, 307 N.W.2d at 269. Other jurisdictions addressing this issue
have been in accord with Wisconsin in their holdings. See Scroggins v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718 (App. Ct. 1979) (the court concluded that
the statute was not designed to protect the class of persons including claimants, but
rather was designed to benefit the insured and to protect the public at large); Bowe v.
Eaton, 17 Wash. App. 840, 565 P.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1977); Contra Jenkins v. J.C. Pen-
ney Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981) (the court concluded that a pri-
vate right of action does exist; however, the unfair conduct must be "frequent," which
was defined as the occurrence of different violations as well as repetition of the same
violation).
93. 103 Wis. 2d at 81, 307 N.W.2d at 269. One commentator has suggested that
the court's reliance on the legislative history of the Act and its analysis of the Act in
Royal Globe was unconvincing and misplaced. "A review of the history of the Act, an
objective examination of the language of the statute, and the construction given the
Act by the agency empowered to enforce it, all support the conclusion that the insur-
ance commissioner was intended to have exclusive power to enforce the prohibitions
of section 790.03." Comment, Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court: Right to
Direct Suit Against an Insurer by a Third Party Claimant, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1161,
1176-83 (1980).
Furthermore, as Justice Richardson pointed out in his dissent, the majority's
word-by-word analysis was "erroneous in its labored attempt to find an ambiguity
where none whatever exists." 23 Cal. 3d at 894, 592 P.2d at 338, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 851
(Richardson, J., dissenting). Justice Richardson further pointed out that "[i]t would
seem obvious that the ... provision was intended to preserve any civil or criminal
liability already provided for under state law, rather than to create new liability
thereby changing pre-existing state law." Id. at 896, 592 P.2d at 339, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
852 (emphasis in original).
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should be extended to encompass claimants. 94 Furthermore,
Justice Abrahamson was persuaded by the manner in which
society views the purpose of the insurance industry as it re-
lates to compensating persons injured by the acts of another.
Although the primary purpose of obtaining liability insurance
is the protection of one's personal assets, another purpose is
to make a person whole again after they have been injured by
the insured.9 5 Justice Abrahamson also found support for the
contention of the claimant being a third-party beneficiary of
the insurance contract in certain Wisconsin laws: the direct
action statute, section 803.04(2); the financial responsibility
laws, chapter 344; worker's compensation laws, chapter 102;
and various insurance laws discussed by the majority.9
Justice Abrahamson further maintained that even if the
theory of treating the injured persons as a third-party benefi-
ciary were rejected, it does not follow that a third-party bad
faith cause of action may not be recognized. The Justice be-
lieved that the majority overlooked the important question of
whether a duty to deal fairly and act in good faith should be
imposed on an insurer by a third-party claimant even in the
absence of a contractual relation.97 The duty of good faith
does not arise from the language of the contract, rather it is
founded upon "principles of justice" and upon "public policy
grounds."9 8 The concept of good faith was viewed as an equi-
table concept. Therefore, the court, in making the determina-
tion of whether to sanction this type of bad faith cause of ac-
94. "Accepting the majority's assertion that privity of contract is required for
the maintenance of a bad faith claim, I would conclude that privity of contract
exists on the facts of the instant case. The third-party victim in this case is the
spouse of the insured and is closely related in interest to the insured. The
spouse is, by statute, protected by the policy." 103 Wis. 2d at 88, 307 N.W.2d
at 272 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
95. 103 Wis. 2d at 90, 307 N.W.2d at 273 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
96. Id.
97. 103 Wis. 2d at 88, 307 N.W.2d at 272 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
I find an important step missing in this reasoning, namely the majority's fail-
ure to discuss or decide whether the law should impose on the insurer a duty of
good faith to the third-party victim in the absence of a contractual relation
between the insurer and the victim. For the majority to assert that the duty
does not exist because there is no privity of contract is simply to restate the
question presented to the court as a conclusion.
Id.
98. 103 Wis. 2d at 91, 307 N.W.2d at 273-74 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
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tion, should rest its decision on public policy grounds and not
on whether there was "privity" of contract between the par-
ties. Justice Abrahamson relied on Walker v. Bignel 9 for the
proposition that when a court is faced with the issue of
whether a legal duty exists, the court is making a policy deter-
mination.100 Among the public policy reasons that Justice
Abrahamson found compelling were: society has an interest in
the fair settlement of insurance claims; the third-party claim-
ant and an insured are in relatively like positions with the in-
surer and, therefore, will suffer the same result if there is a
bad faith refusal to settle; viewing the claimant as an intended
third-party beneficiary goes along with societal views, legisla-
tive views and the intent of the first-party insured.10 1
Justice Abrahamson did recognize that there were impor-
tant public policy reasons supporting the view against recogni-
tion of the cause of action. However, these reasons against
recognition were viewed as being just as relevant to the first-
party bad faith claim.1°2 Therefore, Justice Abrahamson
maintained that the decision should rest in the hands of the
Commissioner of Insurance and the legislature until the court
followed precedent and explained why, as a matter of public
policy, it would not sanction a third-party bad faith cause of
action.103
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, prior case law and public policy dictate that
the duty to deal fairly and in good faith should run only to
the insured. Accordingly, the implied duty of good faith does
not offer a proper basis to permit recovery by third-party
claimants. There are also a number of articulated and unar-
ticulated policy factors which must be taken into considera-
tion in making the determination whether to sanction direct
99. 100 Wis. 2d 256, 301 N.W.2d 447 (1981).
100. 103 Wis. 2d at 92-93, 307 N.W.2d at 274. See also KIassa v. Milwaukee Gas
Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 183-84, 77 N.W.2d 397, 401-02 (1956).
101. 103 Wis. 2d at 93-94, 307 N.W.2d at 274-75.
102. Id. at 95, 307 N.W.2d at 274-75.
103. Id. at 95, 307 N.W.2d at 276. "Until this court takes a position on the ques-
tion, the problem of defining the existence, scope and enforceability of the insurer's
obligation of good faith in dealing with third-party victims is for the Commissioner of
Insurance and the legislature." Id.
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third-party bad faith suits. Among these factors, the most
compelling is that there would be the risk of increased insur-
ance costs. While the goal sought to be reached is admirable,
there would certainly be an increase in the number of settle-
ment agreements reached. At first glance, this would appear
to be an excellent position to achieve. However, it is highly
likely that the settlement offers would be closer to policy lim-
its thereby increasing the cost of insurance or making it more
difficult to obtain.
Another policy factor which must be taken into account is
the probability of an increase in the number of lawsuits. It is
quite predictable that any time a third-party claim does not
reach settlement and goes to trial, an assertion of bad faith
dealing in the failure to settle or negotiate will be included in
the complaint. In states which do not allow the existence of
liability coverage to be introduced into evidence at the trial
for the underlying tort, an additional trial will be necessary to
address the issue of insurer bad faith.
Another problem implicit in the recognition of a direct
third-party bad faith action is the measure of damages. The
claimant often benefits from the claim going to trial since the
award is often in excess of the policy limits. Therefore, it
would be difficult for the courts to calculate the damages sus-
tained by the claimant as a result of the failure to negotiate or
settle in good faith.1 0 4
Since the tort of bad faith is characterized as an inten-
tional tort, there is also the possibility that the claimants will
demand punitive damages. As one commentator on the sub-
ject points out, juries tend to have a predisposition and
prejudice toward insurers; therefore, punitive damage awards
generally do not reflect the compensatory awards. 105
Aside from the public policy arguments which support not
extending the duty to third-party claimants, the fundamental
principles which lie at the foundation of this relatively new
104. One commentator suggests that the appropriate damages should include at-
torney's fees, damages to compensate for emotional distress, and an interest penalty
covering the period between the settlement offer and the entry of judgment. See gen-
erally Comment, Liability Insurers and Third-Party Claimants: The Limits of Duty,
48 U. CH. L. REv. 125 (1981).
105. See DuBois & Bronson, The Spectre of Punitive Damages in First Party
Actions, 40 INs. COUNS. J. 290 (1973).
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tort of bad faith do not lend support for recognizing this new
cause of action. The duty to deal fairly and in good faith to-
ward the insured arises from the contract of insurance and is
based upon a fiduciary relationship. In an excess judgment
case the duty to settle is implied in law to protect the insured
from exposure to a judgment in excess of policy limits. 06 It is
implied because the insured gives up total control to the in-
surer and there is an ensuing conflict of interest.
None of the aforementioned principles underlying the rec-
ognition of the tort of bad faith could logically be viewed to
offer a basis for sanctioning a direct third-party claimant bad
faith action against an insurer. Therefore, a clear signal was
sent to all interested parties: the Wisconsin Supreme Court
will not recognize a cause of action based on a duty to deal
fairly and in good faith which runs to and protects third-party
claimants.
NANCY J. RICE
SECURITIES LAW - Sale of Business by Transfer
of 100% of Corporate Stock Not Governed by Securi-
ties Laws. Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
The accelerating momentum of corporate acquisitions has
yielded a persistent legal issue which, despite thorough litiga-
tion, still lacks final resolution. The question is whether the
federal securities laws are controlling when parties execute the
sale of an incorporated business by means of a transfer of
100% of the corporate stock. Prior to 1970, it was customary
to assume that sale of an existing incorporated business entity
via a transfer of stock would fall within the purview of the
federal securities laws." However, in subsequent lawsuits de-
106. 23 Cal. 3d at 893, 592 P.2d at 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 850 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
1. See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 870 (1961), where defendant selling 100% of corporate stock contested federal
jurisdiction, contending that the federal securities laws exclude private transactions
taking place independently of the national exchanges. There was no allegation that
stock was not a security.
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